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Abstract. In this paper we investigate if generating synthetic data can be a vi-
able strategy for providing access to detailed geocoding information for external
researchers without compromising the confidentiality of the units included in the
database. This research was motivated by a recent project at the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (IAB) in Germany that linked exact geocodes to the Integrated
Employment Biographies, a large administrative database containing several million
records. Based on these data we evaluate the performance of several synthesizers in
terms of addressing the trade-off between preserving analytical validity and limiting
the risk of disclosure. We propose strategies for making the synthesizers scalable for
such large files, present analytical validity measures for the generated data and pro-
vide general recommendations for statistical agencies considering the synthetic data
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approach for disseminating detailed geographical information.We also illustrate that
the commonly used disclosure avoidance strategy of providing geographical informa-
tion only on an aggregated level will not offer substantial improvements in disclosure
protection if coupled with synthesis. As we show in the online supplement accom-
panying this manuscript, synthesizing additional variables should be preferred if the
level of protection from synthesizing only the geocodes is not considered sufficient.
Keywords: CART, disclosure, DPMPM, geocode, synthetic
1 Introduction
In recent years more and more statistical agencies started collecting detailed geocod-
ing information for some of their surveys or administrative databases. Using this
information researchers no longer depend on pre-specified administrative geograph-
ical levels such as municipalities or counties when analyzing spatial effects. Instead
they can define their own geographical areas of interest by aggregating over the
individual geocodes. Furthermore, the detailed geocoding information can also be
used to facilitate the linkage of data from different sources. However, these addi-
tional research opportunities come at a price: the detailed geographical information
makes it very easy to identify individuals in the database. For this reason external
researchers usually cannot get access to the detailed geocodes.
In this paper we evaluate different strategies to generate synthetic geocodes that
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could be disseminated to the public without violating confidentiality guarantees.
With the synthetic data approach sensitive records or records that have a high risk
of disclosure are replaced with draws from a model fitted to the original data. If
the synthesis models are carefully developed, important features of the data are still
maintained while risks of disclosure can be substantially reduced (Drechsler, 2011).
Several strategies have been proposed in the literature for synthesizing data con-
taining detailed geographical information (Machanavajjhala et al., 2008; Sakshaug
and Raghunathan, 2010; Wang and Reiter, 2012; Paiva et al., 2014; Quick et al.,
2015, 2018). We discuss in Section 2 why most of these strategies are not suit-
able for our application. Instead we propose two alternative approaches: The first
approach concatenates the information on latitude and longitude for each record,
treating the resulting variable as an unordered categorical variable, and uses Dirich-
let process mixtures of products of multinomials (DPMPM) for the synthesis. The
usefulness of the DPMPM approach in the context of imputation for nonresponse
was illustrated in Si and Reiter (2013). They found that the DPMPM outperforms
MICE – a very popular imputation tool based on the sequential regression approach
of Raghunathan et al. (2001) – for multiple imputation of missing categorical vari-
ables in large-scale assessment surveys. Hu et al. (2014) first applied the DPMPM
approach in the synthetic data context to generate synthetic data from a subset of
the 2012 American Community Survey with decent utility and risks results. The
second approach generates synthetic values by using CART models (Reiter, 2005)
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for the categorical geocoding variable. These two approaches are compared to an
approach previously proposed by Wang and Reiter (2012), which is also based on
CART models, but treats the information on the latitude and longitude as two sep-
arate continuous variables. We evaluate the three different approaches in terms of
their disclosure protection as well as their ability to preserve the analytical validity
of the data. Assuming the data disseminating agency is not satisfied with the level of
protection offered by synthesizing the geocodes, we evaluate two strategies to further
improve the level of protection: The first strategy follows traditional approaches for
disclosure limitation by aggregating the geocoding information before the synthesis.
The second approach synthesizes additional variables in the dataset. We summarize
the findings from these additional studies in the main text. Detailed results can be
found in the online supplement accompanying this paper.
Our research was motivated by a recent project at the Institute of Employment
Research (IAB) in Germany that added detailed geographical information to the
Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB), a rich administrative data source at
the IAB. The institute is currently investigating strategies for providing access to
these data for external researchers without compromising the confidentiality of the
individuals included in the database (whether the datasets will be disseminated to
the scientific community or access will be granted onsite only still needs to be decided
at this stage). The results presented in this paper are part of this endeavor and all
evaluations of the synthesizers are conducted using a subset of variables from these
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data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we review alter-
native synthetic data approaches for protecting data containing detailed geographical
information and argue why these approaches are not suitable for our application.
Section 3 introduces the IEB. In Section 4 we discuss the two different synthesizers
that we deem suitable for our context: the DPMPM synthesizer and the CART
synthesizer. Section 5 provides some details on the implementation of the different
synthesizers for the IEB synthesis. In Section 6 the analytical validity and the disclo-
sure risk of the generated synthetic datasets are evaluated under various assumptions
regarding the synthesis strategy. The paper concludes with a general discussion of
the three synthesis approaches, implications for the dissemination project at the
IAB, and some ideas for future research.
2 Related approaches
The idea of synthesizing the geographical information to protect the individuals in
the data while still allowing analysis on a detailed geographical level is not new.
In fact, several papers appeared in recent years proposing different strategies for
synthesizing the geographical information. In this section we present a brief review
of the different proposals and discuss the limitations of the proposals for our context.
The first successful implementation of geographical synthesis was discussed in
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Machanavajjhala et al. (2008). The authors propose a strategy for synthesizing the
place of living for all individuals working in the U.S. The synthesizer is used to
generate the underlying data for an application called OnTheMap provided by the
U.S. Census Bureau. This application graphically visualizes commuting patterns on
a detailed geographical level. The authors used a Dirichlet/Multinomial model for
synthesis and adjusted the Dirichlet priors such that they were able to prove that
their synthesizer guaranteed some formal level of privacy called ε − δ differential
privacy (see Machanavajjhala et al. (2008) for details). While the formal privacy
guarantees are a very attractive feature of this approach, this synthesis strategy
would not be suitable for our application. For OnTheMap only two variables needed
to be considered: the place of living and the place of work. But even in this setting
the authors had to come up with special techniques for dealing with the sparsity of
the matrix when cross-classifying the two variables. We are considering 11 variables
in our application and a multinomial model would provide poor results when fitted
to such a high dimensional sparse matrix. Furthermore, the DPMPM can be seen
as an extension to the multinomial model (it consists of a mixture of products of
multinomal models), and thus is generally expected to give better results in terms
of analytical validity than the classical multinomial model.
Another synthesis strategy proposed by Wang and Reiter (2012) is to treat the
detailed geocoding information as a continuous variable and use CART models to
synthesize these geocodes. The synthesizer proposed by the authors is one of the
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synthesizers that we evaluate in this paper. However, we show that improved results
can be achieved if a different synthesis strategy is selected.
Sakshaug and Raghunathan (2010) propose using mixed effects modeling strate-
gies for preserving the geographical information in the synthesized data. Mixed
effects synthesis models are a natural way to preserve the geographical clustering
effect. However, the aim of this modeling strategy is to preserve the geographical
information when synthesizing other variables in the data. It cannot be used to
synthesize the geographical information itself which is the goal for our application.
Paiva et al. (2014) use areal level spatial models (often called disease mapping
models in the literature) to synthesize the geographical information. Although they
start with exact geographies, their methods require defining fine grids over the spa-
tial domain, then using the conditional autoregressive (CAR) model of Besag et al.
(1991) to model the distribution of grid-counts. When synthesizing exact geogra-
phies, they recommend first to synthesize grid cells for each individual, and second
to randomly assign each individual a location within the grid cells. Furthermore,
Paiva et al. (2014) requires a small number of categorical variables with small num-
ber of levels. We find their approach too computationally intensive for the IEB data.
Moreover, their models can at most preserve counts at the grid level, and randomly
sampling exact geographies within a grid is ad hoc. Therefore, we did not include
this approach in our evaluations.
Perhaps the most sophisticated synthesis strategy specifically tailored to preserv-
7
ing spatial statistics is presented in Quick et al. (2015). The authors use marked
point process models for synthesis, which are especially useful if exact geocoding
information is available. Specifically, they propose to model the data in three steps:
(i) specify multinomial models for the categorical variables in the data, (ii) use a
log-Gaussian Cox process to model the geographical location within each cell speci-
fied by cross classifying all categorical variables, and (iii) specify a normal regression
for continuous variables given the categorical variables and location. The authors
point out that estimating this model can be computationally intractable and sug-
gest several steps and simplifying assumptions to reduce the computational burden
for their real data application comprising five attributes on 6,294 records. We did
not include this approach in our evaluations because implementing it will be too
computationally intensive for the IEB data consisting of 10 attributes for more than
3.5 million records.
Yet another synthesis strategy is described in Quick et al. (2018), who used a
differential smoothing synthesizer for locations of home sale in San Francisco. Their
approach is a two-step process. First, they model the log-transformed home sale
prices using an unrestricted hierarchical model. Second, they identify spatial outliers
based on the distances to their nearest neighbors, then fit a restricted hierarchical
model to provide additional smoothing for higher protection. Similar to Sakshaug
and Raghunathan (2010) the goal in this paper is to preserve the spatial structure
of the variables contained in the dataset and not to synthesize the geocodes directly,
8
Social security
notifications
Data from the business processes of the
Federal Employment Agency in Germany
Employ-
ment
Short Term
Benefit Recipients
Program
Participation
Jobseekers
Long Term
Benefit Recipients
IEB
Figure 1: Sources of the IEB
which is the goal in our application.
3 The IEB data
The IEB integrate five different sources of information collected by the Federal Em-
ployment Agency through different administrative procedures: the Employment
History, the Benefit Recipient History, the Participants-in-Measures History, the
Unemployment Benefit II Recipient History, and the Jobseeker History. We refer
to Jacobebinghaus and Seth (2010) for a detailed description of the different data
sources and of the IEB. The schematic overview of the data sources of the IEB is
summarized in Figure 1.
Information available for individuals included in the IEB contains among other
things: beginning and ending date of every employment, date of birth, gender, na-
tionality, education, health status, employment status, monthly wages, and working
place and place of residence at the ZIP code level. Establishment level information is
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provided in the IEB by aggregating individual level information to the establishment
level.
Recently, exact geocoding information has been added for individuals and estab-
lishments included in the IEB at the reference date June 30, 2009. The geocoding
information was obtained from a georeferenced address database for Germany pro-
vided by the Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy which contains approxi-
mately 22 million addresses of German buildings and their corresponding geographic
coordinates. Based on exact matches regarding the address information it was pos-
sible to obtain geocoding information for 94.6% of the 36.2 million individuals and
93.2% of the 2.5 million establishments contained in the IEB on the reference date
(see Scholz et al. (2012) for more details regarding the matching of the two data
sources). Given the large number of variables and the sensitivity of the informa-
tion contained, it is obvious that the linked data cannot be disseminated to the
public using traditional statistical disclosure limitation techniques such as top cod-
ing, noise infusion, or swapping since the geocoding information would make it very
easy to identify individuals in the database. In fact, the data currently available
for external researchers only contain a 2% sample from the IEB with a limited set
of non-sensitive variables and county level information as the lowest level of geo-
graphical detail. Counties with less than 100,000 observations in the full IEB are
collapsed. Several additional steps such as aggregating some variables or dropping
employment information outside a given age range are taken to ensure a sufficient
10
variable characteristics
exact geocoding information recorded as distance in meters from the point
of the place of living 52◦northern latitude, 10◦eastern longitude
sex male/female
foreign yes/no
age 6 categories
(<20, 20–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–60, >60 years)
education 6 categories
occupation level 7 categories
occupation 12 categories
industry of the employer 15 categories
wage 10 categories defined by quantiles
distance to work 5 categories (≤1, 1–5, 5–10, 10–20, >20 km)
ZIP code 2,063 ZIP code levels
Table 1: Variables included in the data set used for the evaluations
level of confidentiality protection (see Section 3.4 in Ganzer et al. (2017) for further
details regarding the anonymisation measures).
To be able to provide access to the detailed geocoding information for external
researchers, the IAB is looking for innovative ways to generate a sufficiently protected
version of the linked data that still contains useful information at least on some of the
variables. It was decided to start with a limited set of variables initially and extend
the set in the future if reasonable results, both in terms of disclosure risk and data
utility, could be achieved in the first round. For simplicity, the variables included
in this preliminary dataset are chosen to avoid structural zeros; that is, all cells in
the implied contingency table have non-zero probability. We note that structural
zeros can be incorporated in the DPMPM model using the methodology presented in
Manrique-Vallier and Reiter (2014). Structural zeros are automatically maintained
if the CART approach is used. The selected variables are listed in Table 1.
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4 Modeling assumptions for the different synthesizers
In this section we briefly describe the DPMPM and the CART approaches for gen-
erating synthetic data that we considered as potential candidates for protecting
the geocoding information in the data. More details on both synthesizers can be
found in the appendix. The DPMPM is a Bayesian semi-parametric procedure. It
uses a Dirichlet process mixture of products of multinomial distributions, which is
a Bayesian version of a latent class model. The basic idea is to assume that each
observation belongs to one of a potentially infinite number of latent classes and con-
ditional on class assignment the variables contained in the data can be considered
independent. It can be shown that the DPMPM provides full support on the space of
distributions for multiple unordered categorical variables (Dunson and Xing, 2009).
See Appendix A for more details on how the DPMPM can be turned into an engine
for data synthesis.
The CART approach is nonparametric and is based on classification and regres-
sion trees from the machine learning literature. As outlined in Drechsler and Reiter
(2011), the approach seeks to approximate the conditional distribution of a univari-
ate outcome from multiple predictors. The CART algorithm partitions the predictor
space so that subsets of units formed by the partitions have relatively homogeneous
outcomes. The partitions are found by recursive binary splits of the predictors. The
series of splits can be effectively represented by a tree structure, with leaves corre-
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sponding to the subsets of units. The values in each leaf represent the conditional
distribution of the outcome for units in the data with predictors that satisfy the
partitioning criteria that define the leaf. CART has been adapted for generating
partially synthetic data (Reiter, 2005) and we refer to Appendix B for more details
how this can be achieved. In our evaluations, we use a continuous CART synthesizer
and a categorical CART synthesizer.
In this article we assume that the aim is to generate partially synthetic data,
i.e., only some of the variables in the released data will be synthesized. We note
that both approaches can also be used to synthesize all variables, i.e., to generate
fully synthetic data. See Drechsler (2011) for a detailed discussion of the different
approaches to generating synthetic data.
5 Synthesis of the IEB
For our evaluations, we selected individuals living in Bavaria and deleted all obser-
vations with missing information in any of the variables. Since most of the variables
such as wage or distance to work are only observed if the individual is employed
at the reference date, the final dataset consisting of 3,333,998 records represents
the working population in Bavaria. We initially only synthesized the geocoding in-
formation for the place of living. If the disclosure risks based on this strategy are
deemed too high it is straightforward to use the synthesis models described above to
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synthesize additional variables in the dataset. We explore the impacts of additional
synthesis on risk and utility in Section 6.3.
Running the synthesis models on the entire dataset would be prohibitive due to
the size of the data, so we clustered all the observations based on their geographic lo-
cations into 222 similar-sized clusters, containing 15,000 records each (except for the
last cluster which contains 18,998 records) and ran the synthesis models separately
for each cluster. We achieved the clustering using the MDAV (maximum distance
to average record) algorithm (Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz, 2012). Since the
synthesis models are independent between the clusters it is possible to run the syn-
thesis for each cluster in parallel. This way the synthesis procedure becomes scalable
even if the entire dataset for Germany with more than 36 million records should be
synthesized. Of course running the synthesis only within clusters also implies an
increased risk of disclosure since the outcome space of the synthetic geocodes is
bounded by the geocodes observed within the cluster. We take this into account
when evaluating the risks of disclosure in Section 6.2.
We ran the MCMC sampler for the DPMPM synthesizer for 10,000 iterations,
treating the first 5,000 iterations as burn-in and storing only every 10th iteration to
reduce the correlation between the successive draws. The 5,000 iterations from the
burn-in period (i.e. the first 5,000 iterations at the beginning of the MCMC chain)
are not used to ensure that the MCMC sampler converged before any parameters
are drawn for synthesis. To monitor convergence and autocorrelation, we focused on
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the parameter α which is not subject to label switching. We used the Geweke and
Heidelberger and Welch’s diagnostics and inspected the autocorrelation function to
evaluate the behaviour of the MCMC sampler for this parameter. For those clusters
for which our evaluation criteria indicated that the successive draws of the sampler
were still correlated we reran the MCMC sampler storing only every 50th iteration.
We did not find any problematic cases based on our evaluation criteria after this
extra step. We set the maximum number of allowed latent classes to F = 100. The
posterior mean of the number of occupied classes is 57.8 with a 95% central interval
of (51,64) and a maximum of 73.
For the CART synthesizer we used the default values implemented in the rpart
package in R (Therneau et al., 2015) for two of the three tuning parameters that
control the size of the trees that are grown: The default for the minimum number
of observations that must exist in a node in order for a split to be attempted is
20 and the default for the minimum number of observations in any terminal leaf is
seven. However, we set the the third tuning parameter – the complexity parameter
– to a very low value of cp = 0.00001 (the default is cp = 0.01). Any split that
does not decrease the overall lack of fit by a factor of cp is not attempted. Since we
are interested in preserving the relationships between the geocodes and the other
variables in the dataset as closely as possible to obtain high analytical validity of
the synthetic data, we choose a very low level for this parameter. We note that
this parameter is the most useful of the three tuning parameters for balancing the
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analytical validity and the disclosure risk of the generated data. If the risks are
considered too high the synthesis could be repeated using a larger cp value.
For the continuous synthesizer we initially evaluated two synthesis sequences:
synthesizing the longitude before synthesizing the latitude conditional on the longi-
tude and vice versa. However, we found that the analytical validity and disclosure
risks were almost identical and thus we only report the results for the longitude-
then-latitude synthesis order below.
We generated m = 5 synthetic datasets for each cluster for all synthesizers.
6 Analytical validity and disclosure risk
6.1 Evaluation of the analytical validity of the generated data
Ideally, evaluations of the analytical validity should provide a single measure for the
utility of the synthetic data. However, global measures that have been suggested in
the literature to compare the original and the synthetic data such as the Kullback-
Leibler distance are often not very informative. On the one hand it is not clear
which value of the measure indicates an acceptable validity level. On the other
hand, even if the global utility measure indicates high analytical validity, this does
not necessary hold for a specific model a potential analyst is interested in. Thus,
outcome specific utility measures such as the confidence interval overlap suggested
in Karr et al. (2006) are usually employed. The downside of these measures is that
16
a high level of data utility for one model does not necessarily imply high levels of
utility for other models of interest.
In this paper we try to address the limitations of both approaches by first pro-
viding some results for model specific utility measures and then moving on to global
measures of the utility of the synthetic data. We note that the confidence interval
overlap measure proposed by Karr et al. (2006) is not suitable for our application
since the data comprise the entire population and thus there is no uncertainty in
the results based on the original data.
6.1.1 Outcome specific utility measures
To evaluate the validity for specific outcomes we assume that the analyst is interested
in looking at the data at a very detailed geographical level. Figures 2 and 3 provide
results for two different outcomes computed at the ZIP code level. We note that
the synthetic data contain geocodes on the same level of detail as in the original
data. Thus, the analyst would be very flexible in defining the geographical area she
is interested in. We choose the ZIP code level for three reasons: First, we need a
sensible strategy to cluster all the data for Bavaria. The ZIP code offers a natural
way of clustering the data on a very detailed level without the necessity of specifying
arbitrary boundaries for setting up the clusters. Second, the number of records vary
considerably between ZIP codes ranging from just a few cases in rural areas to more
than 10,000 cases for densely populated areas (the median size is 535 cases). Thus,
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the ZIP code level evaluation covers statistics which should be relatively easy to
preserve (since they are based on a large number of cases) as well as statistics for
rural areas which will be difficult to preserve. Finally, choosing the ZIP code level
offers the convenience that maps can be generated relatively easily using any GIS
software, since the geocodes of the ZIP code boundaries are directly available. We
compute the ZIP codes for the synthetic data by identifying the closest geocode in
the original data and transferring its ZIP code information. While there will always
be an exact match for the synthesizers which treat the geocode as categorical and
thus, the ZIP code will always be correct, this does not hold for the continuous
synthesizer. For this approach it might happen that the closest observed geocode
might actually belong to another ZIP code area. However, given the detailed grid
provided by the original data, we believe these cases are rare and thus do not justify
the more labor intensive task of identifying the correct ZIP code directly from the
synthetic geocodes.
Figure 2 depicts the share of high wage earners in Bavaria, where high wages are
defined as wages above the seventieth quantile of the wage distribution in Bavaria.
Figure 3 depicts the share of foreigners. In both figures the results based on the
original data and the results based on the three different synthesizers are depicted.
All synthesizers preserve the wage distribution rather well. The results are more
diverse for the foreigners. This is not surprising given that by definition 30% of the
records in the data are high wage earners whereas only 6.17% of the individuals are
18
Figure 2: Share of high wage earners in Bavaria by ZIP code level.
foreigners, i.e., the distribution is far more skewed and thus more difficult to preserve.
For both figures it is evident that the DPMPM synthesizer does not preserve the
geographical heterogeneity as well as the CART synthesizers. The DPMPM model
seems to smooth the distributions so that the shares are overestimated in those
regions in which the shares are low in the original data. This is especially evident
in Figure 3. The two CART models preserve the wage distribution similarly well.
However, the continuous CART model fails to preserve the distribution of foreigners.
As with the DPMPM models the distribution is smoothed out compared to the
distribution in the original data although to a lesser extent than with the DPMPM
model. For the categorical CART model we do not find any substantial differences
between the original data and the synthetic data, indicating a very high level of
analytical validity.
We also consider Ripley’s K-function (Ripley, 1976, 1977), a measure of spatial
19
Figure 3: Share of foreigners in Bavaria by ZIP code level.
dependence that calculates the expected number of events of an arbitrary event,
within a given radius r (Quick et al., 2015; Shirota and Gelfand, 2017). In particular,
we consider the multitype K-function, which counts the expected number Kˆi(r) of
other points of the process within a given distance of a point of type i (Lotwick and
Silverman, 1982).
Kˆi(r) = |Ds|
∑
i 6=j
I(||si − sj|| ≤ r)
n× ni ,
where |Ds| is the area of spatial domain, n is the total number of points and ni is
the number of points of type i.
To measure spatial dependence, it is common to compute the L-function
Lˆi(r) =
√
Kˆi(r)/pi − r,
where positive values of Lˆi(r) indicate spatial clustering.
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We use the R package spatstat (Baddeley et al., 2015) to calculate the Lˆi(r)
functions for the distributions of 1) individuals with no vocational training, and 2)
individuals aged 60 and older, in Nuremberg, Bavaria. For each synthesizer, we
calculate the Lˆi(r) functions for the same range of r values in each of the synthetic
datasets and average them across datasets. Figure 4 compares the resulting curves
to the curve obtained using the original data.
All synthesizers preserve the spatial information rather well. The difference be-
tween the estimated values of L from the original data and the synthetic data are
small for both variables for all levels of r considered here. Still, the DPMPM results
diverge most from the results based on the original data. The continuous CART
synthesizer offers some improvements, while for the categorical CART synthesizer
the results are basically indistinguishable from the results based on the original
data. The results for Nuremberg are in line with the findings for Bavaria discussed
above: In terms of preserving the analytical validity, the categorical CART synthe-
sizer should always be preferred while the DPMPM synthesizer provides the least
favorable results.
6.1.2 Global utility measures
Our approach to evaluating the global utility of the protected dataset is to compare
relative frequencies for various cross tabulations of the variables contained in the
original data and the synthetic data. Again, we choose the ZIP code as the level of
21
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Figure 4: L functions for individuals without vocational training and individuals
aged 60 or older in the city of Nuremberg.
geographical detail for the reasons laid out in Section 6.1.1. Specifically, for each ZIP
code we first compute the relative frequencies for each cell entry for various cross
classifications of all variables, i.e., all marginal distributions, two-way interactions,
and three-way interactions. Then we evaluate how much these relative frequencies
differ between the original data and the synthetic data.
Figure 5 contains the distribution of the differences across all clusters for different
interaction levels. Since the utility measure effectively measures the difference in
relative frequencies between the original data and the protected data, the higher
the density of the distribution around zero the better the analytical validity. To
get a one-number measure for the loss in data utility we also compute the average
absolute values of the differences across all cells. These numbers are reported for
each synthesizer in the upper left corner of each panel in Figure 5. The smaller the
number, the better the utility.
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Figure 5: Global utility results. Distributions of differences in relative frequencies
between the original data and the protected data. The numbers in the upper left
corner represent the average absolute values of the differences for the different syn-
thesizers.
The results are similar to the results regarding the outcome specific utility mea-
sures: The synthesizer based on the categorical CART model provides the best result
followed by the CART model that treats the geocodes as continuous variables. The
DPMPM model consistently performs the worst. Looking at the one-number mea-
sure the differences are quite dramatic: The values of the DPMPM model are always
more than 1.7 times the values for the categorical CART model.
6.2 Evaluation of the disclosure risk for the generated data
The results from the previous section indicate that from a utility perspective the
categorical CART model should always be preferred. However, when disseminating
confidential data to the public, there is always a trade-off between data utility and
disclosure risk. The categorical CART synthesizer will only be useful if the increase
in the risks of disclosure that results from the increase of the utility are deemed
acceptable. Thus, we will compare the disclosure risks of the various synthesizers in
23
this section.
To evaluate disclosure risks, we compute probabilities of identification using
methods developed in Reiter and Mitra (2009). A detailed description of the method-
ology is given in Appendix C. Here we only summarize the main ideas. Suppose the
intruder has information on some target records which she will use in a record linkage
attack to identify the targets in the released data. Similar to the concept of prob-
abilistic record linkage, the idea is to estimate the probability of a match between
each target record and each record in the released file. The record with highest
average matching probability across the synthetic datasets is the declared match.
In the evaluation, we use three risk measures that are summaries of these match-
ing probabilities. The expected match risk, which computes the expected number
of correctly declared matches, the true match rate, which computes the number of
correct single matches among the target records, and the false match rate, which
computes the number of erroneously declared single matches among all declared
single matches.
We note that the proposed risk measures assume that a potential intruder knows
that the target records he or she is looking for are included in the database. This is
reasonable in our application, since the IEB basically covers the entire population.
If the IAB decides that only a sample of the synthetic IEB should be released in the
end to further increase the confidentiality protection, the risk measures could easily
be adjusted to account for the sampling uncertainty using the extensions proposed
24
in Drechsler and Reiter (2008).
For our evaluations we assume that the intruder knows the exact geocode, sex,
age category, industry of the employer, occupation and the information whether
the individual is a foreigner or not and uses this information to try to identify the
individuals in the database. We sample 100 records from each cluster and assume
that these 22,200 records are the target records that the intruder tries to find in the
data. For the geocode we assume that the intruder constructs grids of different size
and considers all records that fall in the same grid as matches. We evaluate the risks
for four different grids: 100x100, 1,000x1,000, 10,000x10,000, and 20,000x20,000
square meter grids. We also compute the risk measures if the intruder would match
on the exact geocodes. To account for the increased risk from clustering the data
before the synthesis, we block on the cluster when matching the target records.
This is a conservative approach since the intruder would not be able to identify
the clusters in the released data. Still, we believe most agencies would prefer being
conservative instead of underestimating the risks of a data release strategy.
The estimated risks for the original data without the geocodes are as follows:
expected risk: 1821.16, true rate: 2.56%, and false rate: 0. These risks serve as a
benchmark since under the current regulations external researchers can access a 2%
sample of the IEB (without geocodes) through the Research Data Center of the IAB
already. So any synthetic data with similar risks should be considered sufficiently
protected as long as the data can only be accessed under similar conditions.
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Table 2: Expected match risk (ER), true match rate (TR in %), and false match
rate (FR in %) for various grid sizes
CARTcat CARTcont DPMPM
Grid ER TR FR ER TR FR ER TR FR
Exact 4665.74 17.33 64.64 1.48 0.00 100.00 25.70 0.10 98.47
100× 100 4459.14 16.49 67.07 172.59 0.66 93.97 95.78 0.36 97.98
1, 000× 1, 000 3167.14 11.55 82.58 1361.57 4.81 90.36 769.03 2.46 94.69
10, 000× 10, 000 2226.34 7.32 85.82 2111.10 6.76 86.38 1585.18 5.16 91.20
20, 000× 20, 000 2054.49 5.82 81.18 2009.45 5.42 81.26 1733.98 5.04 86.76
Table 2 presents the results for the different scenarios. As expected the risks in-
crease with increasing analytical validity. The DPMPM synthesizer that showed the
lowest analytical validity is associated with lowest disclosure risks for all matching
strategies, except for the matching on exact geocodes, where the risks associated
with the continuous CART are even lower. The categorical CART synthesizer with
very high analytical validity also leads to the highest risk of disclosure.
For the DPMPM and the continuous CART synthesizer the risks are increasing
with increasing grid size (except for a decease for the continuous CART when going
from the 10,000x10,000 grids to the 20,000x20,000 grids). Arguably, for these two
synthesizers the risks do not increase substantially compared to the risks for the data
without geocodes. The expected risks are slightly larger for the continuous CART
if the intruder uses very large grids (≥ 10, 000 square meters) for the matching with
a maximum risk of 2111.1 compared to 1821.16 for the data without geocodes. The
percentage of correct unique matches (the true match rate) is also larger for both
the continuous CART and the DPMPM if the intruder chooses grid sizes ≥ 1, 000
square meters with a maximum at 6.76% for the continuous CART and 5.16% for the
DPMPM (2.56% for the original data without geocodes). However, these increased
risks are balanced by the fact that (a) the intruder would not know which grid size to
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pick and (b) that most of the unique matches would actually be false matches (always
more than 81% for the continuous CART and more than 86% for the DPMPM
synthesizer). For the original data without geocodes the false match rate has to be
zero by definition since the intruder can always be sure that he or she identified the
correct individual if a unique match is found.
The results are different for the categorical CART synthesizer. Here, the risks
decrease monotonically with increasing grid size and both the expected risk mea-
sure (with a maximum of 4665.74) and the true match rate (with a maximum of
17.33) indicate a substantial increase in risk compared to releasing the data without
geocoding information.
6.3 Strategies to further increase the level of protection
If the agency feels that these risk increases are not counterbalanced by the fact that
the intruder will be wrong in at least 64% of the cases when he or she declares a
unique match to be the correct match, the agency would have three options: (a) use
one of the other synthesizers and accept the loss in analytical validity, (b) repeat the
synthesis for the categorical CART synthesizer increasing the complexity parameter
to grow smaller trees, or (c) use additional measures to further protect the data.
We evaluated the last option based on two different approaches. The first ap-
proach aggregates the geographical information to a higher level. The second ap-
proach synthesizes additional variables in the dataset. We only present the main
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findings for the categorical CART synthesizer here for brevity. Detailed results can
be found in the online supplement.
Aggregating the geographical information is a classical data protection measure
that is commonly employed by statistical agencies before data dissemination. Thus,
we evaluated how the risk-utility profile changes if the detailed geographical infor-
mation is aggregated to a higher level before the synthesis. Specifically, we looked
at the impacts of using 10, 100, and 1,000 square meter grids instead of the exact
geocodes. We found that risks remain constant for the 10 square meter grids and
actually increase if 100 square meter grids are used. The risks decrease for the 1,000
square meter grids but are still substantially higher than the risks from the origi-
nal data without geocodes (for example, the expected risk is 3717.65 compared to
1821.16 for the original data). At the same time the loss in analytical validity as
expressed by the UL measure would increase for such large grid sizes (the UL mea-
sure increases from 8.57 · 10−2 when synthesizing the exact geocodes to 8.74 · 10−2
when using 1,000 square meter grids).
As an alternative the IAB could decide to synthesize more variables, if the level of
protection from synthesizing the geocodes is not deemed to be sufficient. We looked
at different synthesis strategies starting with synthesizing one additional variable
(age), successively adding occupation and foreign status to the list of synthesized
variables. In the final setting we synthesized all variables except for wage and
sex. As expected both risk and utility will decrease with increasing amounts of
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synthesis. However, the decreases in risk are more pronounced. While the UL
measure only increases by 4.1% to 7.9% for the first three scenarios and 14.8% for
the scenario in which almost all variables are synthesized, the expected match risk
decreases between 60.9% and 85.6% for the first three scenarios and 99.7% for the
final scenario. We also find that the analytical validity of the categorical CART
synthesizer when synthesizing almost all variables in the dataset is still higher than
if any of the other synthesizers considered in the previous section would be used
for synthesizing the geocode alone. Again, we refer to the online supplement for a
detailed discussion of the results.
7 Discussion
Access to detailed geographical information is desirable in many situations. However,
providing this access is challenging in practice since detailed geographical informa-
tion will substantially increase the risks of reidentification for two reasons: First, the
geographical information for the target records the intruder is looking for is usually
easily available. Second, if the information is sufficiently detailed, only few individ-
uals will share the same value. In fact, if detailed geocodes are released unaltered,
they can be viewed as direct identifiers since they will often uniquely identify indi-
viduals in the database. For these reasons, innovative data protection procedures
offering a very high level of protection are required if detailed geographical informa-
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tion should be released. In our view, the synthetic data approach is the only viable
solution for this endeavor.
We used three different synthesizers in this paper for synthesizing the geocod-
ing information and evaluated how well they address the common dilemma in data
confidentiality: the trade-off between disclosure risk and analytical validity. The
continuous CART synthesizer has been suggested before to protect detailed geocod-
ing information (Wang and Reiter, 2012). The DPMPM synthesizer gained a lot of
attention recently due to its improved performance compared to other parametric
approaches for categorical variables (Si and Reiter, 2013; Hu et al., 2014). How-
ever, we found that using CART models and treating the geocodes as categorical
variables provided the best results. The DPMPM model generally failed to preserve
the analytical validity and while the continuous CART synthesizer performed better
than the DPMPM model the validity still was considerably lower than the validity of
the categorical CART synthesizer. The relatively poor performance of the DPMPM
might be due to the fact that the DPMPM approach tries to model the full joint
distribution of all the variables although we actually only need a good model for the
conditional distribution of the geocodes given all the other variables in our synthesis
application. This is exactly what the CART-based approaches try to model and
it might be easier to capture this conditional distribution instead of the full joint
distribution. Comparing the two CART approaches, the continuous CART synthe-
sizer might be inferior in terms of analytical validity because geographical proximity
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might not be a good measure for setting up the splitting rules (with continuous
variables CART will try to minimize the variance in each leaf, which might not be
a useful criterion with geocodes).
The continuous CART has the additional disadvantage that it can produce im-
plausible geocodes, such as places of living in the middle of a lake, in a forest, or in
industrial areas. This cannot happen with the categorical CART since the geocodes
are modeled as categorical and thus only geocodes that were observed in the orig-
inal data could appear in the synthetic data. This could be problematic in some
applications in which the collected data only comprises a sample of the population
and the information that an individual participated in the survey is already con-
fidential. Releasing unaltered geocodes would put some individuals at risk even if
the synthetic geocodes were attached to different units since the information would
be revealed that someone living at a specific geographical location included in the
data must have participated. However, since the IEB covers the entire population,
this is less problematic in our context. All individuals from the population should
be included in this database and the information that someone lives at a specific
location is generally not confidential.
Nevertheless, unsurprisingly the increased validity of the categorical CART ap-
proach comes at the price of increased risks of disclosure. However, we found that at
least in this application the agency would be better off synthesizing more variables
instead of relying on one of the other synthesizers or aggregating the geocodes. We
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note that our risk evaluations did not consider the fact that samples of the IEB
without detailed geographical information have been disseminated previously. Po-
tentially intruders could use this information when trying to re-identify units in the
synthetic data. However, the data are only available to the scientific community and
underwent several anonymization procedures. We feel that our assumptions that the
intruder knows the exact geocode, sex, age category, industry of the employer, oc-
cupation and the information whether the individual is a foreigner or not is already
a conservative assumption. The only additional variables available in the previously
released data are education and wage, but with the low level of geographical detail
in these data it would not be possible for the intruder to obtain record level infor-
mation for these variables for the target records. We thus expect that the increase
in risk would be negligible.
Based on our findings we provide the following general recommendations for
statistical agencies considering to use the synthetic data approach to disseminate
detailed geocoding information:
1. The categorical CART synthesizer should be used in preference to the DPMPM
and the continuous CART since it better preserves the analytical validity than
the other synthesizers considered in this paper.
2. If the risks based on the synthetic geocodes are deemed too high, the agency
should consider synthesizing more variables since disclosure risks drop quickly
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with the amount of synthesis often with a small sacrifice in analytical validity.
3. Aggregating the geographical information before the synthesis is not recom-
mended as it offers only little protection unless the level of aggregation is large.
The loss of information will be substantial in this case.
4. If the database is large, clustering the data before the synthesis is recommended
since the increases in risk are moderate if sufficiently large clusters are selected
while huge efficiency gains are possible by parallelizing the synthesis of the
clusters.
An alternative approach for increasing the level of protection that we did not
evaluate in this paper would be to increase the level of the complexity parameter cp
for the CART models. Increasing the cp value would result in smaller trees which will
increase the uncertainty in the generated data since more records would end up in
the same terminal leaf from which the synthetic records would be drawn. However,
we expect that the trade-off between risk and validity will be less favorable compared
to increasing the amount of synthesis. If smaller trees are grown some relationships
in the data necessarily are no longer reflected in the synthetic data. If more variables
are synthesized based on accurate synthesis models we expect the information loss
to be less substantial. However, evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of the
two strategies would be an interesting area of future research.
We also note that we arbitrarily picked the additional variables to be synthesized
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in Section 6.3. This strategy could certainly be improved depending on the goals
of the agency. If the agency wants to maximize the level of protection offered it
would be advisable to start with those variables that impose the highest risks of
disclosure, for example, variables with large numbers of categories or sparsely pop-
ulated categories. If the goal is to minimize the negative impacts on validity, the
agency should pick the variable for which the CART model provides the best fit.
Ideally, the agency would evaluate various synthesis combinations and pick the one
that best addresses the risk-utility tradeoff according to the requirements set up by
the agency. Only this model would then be used to generate the synthetic datasets
which would then be disseminated to the public.
Regarding the actual implementation of the synthetic data approach for the
IEB data, the initial results presented in this paper are encouraging enough to
consider the approach as a realistic strategy for disseminating the data. Still, several
problems need to be tackled before the approach can be used in practice: The set of
variables will have to be expanded to satisfy user needs (the original data contain
more than 50 variables). In this case it might no longer be sufficient to only protect
the geographical information. In principal, the synthesis approach could easily be
extended by simply synthesizing additional variables as illustrated in Section 6.3.
For example, if income information would be included on the original scale and not
discretized, regression trees could be used to protect the detailed income information
(see Reiter (2005) for details). However, modeling some of the variables included in
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the IEB, such as beginning and ending date of each employment spell is a challenging
task. Furthermore, the exact geocodes are not only available for the place of living
but also for the place of work. Providing access to both geocodes would allow
addressing many additional research questions for example regarding commuting
behaviour. The synthesis methods would have to be adapted in this case to deal
with this additional information. Simply fitting classification trees using the place of
living as an additional predictor when synthesizing the place of work will not be an
option given the amount of detail contained in the former. At the same time releasing
both geocodes will substantially increase the risk of disclosure. Addressing all these
issues will be an interesting area of future research. Whether the synthesizer should
be extended first to address all these problems or whether a substantially reduced
subset of variables should be released at this stage currently still needs to be decided.
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A The DPMPM Synthesizer
Following Hu et al. (2014), let the confidential data D comprise n individuals mea-
sured on p categorical variables. For i = 1, . . . , n and k = 1, . . . , p, let yik denote
the value of variable k for individual i, and let yi = (yi1, . . . , yip). Without loss of
generality, assume that each yik takes on values in {1, . . . , dk}, where dk ≥ 2 is the
total number of categories for variable k. Effectively, the survey variables form a
contingency table of d = d1×d2×· · ·×dp cells defined by cross-classifications of the
p variables. Let Yik and Yi be random variables defined respectively on the sample
spaces for yik and yi.
We generate synthetic data using a finite number of mixture components in the
DPMPM. Paraphrasing from Si and Reiter (2013), the finite DPMPM assumes that
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each individual i belongs to exactly one of F < ∞ latent classes; see Si and Reiter
(2013) for advice on determining F . For i = 1, . . . , n, let ηi ∈ {1, . . . , F} indicate the
class of individual i, and let pif = Pr(ηi = f). We assume that pi = (pi1, . . . , piF ) is
the same for all individuals. Within any class, each of the p variables independently
follows a class-specific multinomial distribution, so that individuals in the same
latent class have the same cell probabilities. For any value c ∈ {1, . . . , dk}, let
φ
(k)
fc = Pr(Yik = c | ηi = f) be the probability of Yik = c given that individual i is in
class f . Let φ = {φ(k)fc : c = 1, . . . , dk, k = 1, . . . , p, f = 1, . . . , F} be the collection of
all φ
(k)
fc . The finite mixture model can be expressed as
Yik | ηi, φ ind∼ Multinomial(φ(k)ηi1, . . . , φ(k)ηidk) for all i, k (1)
ηi | pi ∼ Multinomial(pi1, . . . , piF ) for all i, (2)
where each multinomial distribution has sample size equal to one and the number
of levels is implied by the dimension of the corresponding probability vector.
For prior distributions on pi and φ, we use the truncated stick breaking represen-
tation of Sethuraman (1994). We have
pif = Vf
∏
l<f
(1− Vl) for f = 1, . . . , F (3)
Vf
iid∼ Beta(1, α) for f = 1, . . . , F − 1, VF = 1 (4)
α ∼ Gamma(aα, bα) (5)
φ
(k)
f = (φ
(k)
f1 , . . . , φ
(k)
fdk
) ∼ Dirichlet(ak1, . . . , akdk). (6)
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We set ak1 = · · · = akdk = 1 for all k to correspond to uniform distributions.
Following Dunson and Xing (2009) and Si and Reiter (2013), we set (aα = .25, bα =
.25), which represents a small prior sample size and hence vague specification for
the Gamma distribution. In practice, we find these specifications allow the data
to dominate the prior distribution. We estimate the posterior distribution of all
parameters using a blocked Gibbs sampler (Ishwaran and James (2001), Si and
Reiter (2013)).
We illustrate how to generate one synthetic dataset assuming that only the pth
variable Yp should be synthesized. Thus, φ
(p) contains all multinomial probabili-
ties associated with Yp. To generate one partial synthetic dataset of size n, we first
sample a value of the parameters (α,V, pi, φ(p)) from their respective posterior distri-
butions. Using the drawn value of pi, we sample values of (η1, . . . , ηn) independently
from (2). Using the sampled φ(p), for each sampled ηi, where i = 1, . . . , n, we then
sample the ith synthetic record, y∗i = (yi1, . . . , yip−1, y
∗
ip), from a multinomial distri-
bution with probabilities φ
(p)
ηi for Yp. The synthesis can be conveniently implemented
inside the blocked Gibbs sampler – after each Gibbs updating step, we simply sam-
ple and save draws of y∗i for all n records. To create m > 1 synthetic datasets, one
repeats this process m times, using approximately independent draws of parameters.
Approximately independent draws can be obtained by using iterations that are far
apart in the estimated MCMC chain.
If more than one variable should be synthesized, the DPMPM synthesizer can
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be implemented by generating each synthetic variable independently at the de-
sired iterations. Suppose there are r (r ≤ p) variables to be synthesized, and
let Yl (l = 1, . . . , r) represent the lth variable to be synthesized. Assume that
the variables in the dataset are ordered so that the p − r that remain unaltered
appear first. After sampling ηi, we can sample the ith synthetic record, y
∗
i =
(yi1, . . . , yip−r, y∗ip−r+1, . . . , y
∗
ip), from corresponding multinomial distributions with
probabilities φ
(l)
ηi for Yl. Note that the synthesis order does not matter, because
each variable independently follows a multinomial distribution given the latent class
assignment.
B The CART Synthesizer
The following description of the CART synthesizer borrows heavily from Drechsler
and Reiter (2011) and the interested reader is referred to this paper for more details
on CART synthesizers and other machine learning approaches for data synthesis.
First the agency fits the tree of Yp conditioning on all other variables in the dataset
so that each leaf contains at least d records; call this tree Y(p). In general, we have
found that using the default specification which varies between d = 5 and d = 7
depending on the software, provides sufficient accuracy and reasonably fast running
time. We cease splitting any particular leaf when the “impurity” in that leaf is less
than some agency-specified threshold or when we cannot ensure at least d records in
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each child leaf. The “impurity” basically measures the heterogeneity of the outcome
variable in each leaf. For continuous variables the variance in each leaf is commonly
used as an impurity measure. For categorical variables the Gini coefficient or the
entropy are typically employed. We use the Gini coefficient in our application since it
is recommended for categorical variables with more than two categories (Berk, 2008).
See, for example, Berk (2008) for a more detailed discussion of impurity measures.
For all records i = 1, ..., n in the original data, we trace down the branches of Y(p)
until we find that record’s terminal leaf. Let Lw be the wth terminal leaf in Y(p),
and let Y
(p)
Lw
be the nLw values of Yp in leaf Lw. For all records whose terminal
leaf is Lw, we generate replacement values of Ypi by drawing from Y
(p)
Lw
using the
Bayesian bootstrap (Rubin, 1981). Repeating the Bayesian bootstrap for each leaf
of Y(p) provides one synthetic dataset. We repeat this process m times to generate
m datasets with synthetic values for Yp.
If more than one variable should be synthesized, a sequential regression multi-
variate imputation approach (SRMI, Raghunathan et al. (2001)) can be used. In
such cases, for an arbitrary ordering of the variables the agencies can proceed as
follows. Let Yl represent the lth variable in the synthesis order and let Y0 be all
variables with no values replaced.
1. Run the CART algorithm to regress Y1 on Y0 only. Replace Y1 by synthetic
values using the corresponding synthesizer for Y1. Let Y
∗
1 be the replaced
values of Y1.
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2. Run the algorithm to regress Y2 on (Y0, Y1) only. Replace Y2 with synthetic
values using the corresponding synthesizer for Y2. Use the values of Y
∗
1 and Y0
for predicting new values for Y2. Let Y
∗
2 be the replaced values of Y2.
3. For each l where l = 3, . . . , r, run the algorithm to regress Yl on (Y0, Y1, . . . ,
Yl−1). Replace each Yl using the appropriate synthesizer based on the values
in (Y0, Y
∗
1 , Y
∗
2 , . . . , Y
∗
l−1).
The result is one synthetic dataset. These three steps are repeated for each of the
m synthetic datasets, and these datasets are released to the public.
C Methodology for Estimating the Risk of Disclosure
The description of the methodology follows the description given in Drechsler and
Reiter (2010). Suppose the intruder has a vector of information, t, on a particular
target unit in the population P. Let t0 be the unique identifier of the target, and let
Pi0 be the (not released) unique identifier for record i in dsyn, where dsyn denotes
the synthetic data and i = 1, . . . , n. Let S be any information released about the
simulation models.
The intruder’s goal is to match unit i in dsyn to the target when Pi0 = t0. Let
J be a random variable that equals i when Pi0 = t0 for i ∈ dsyn. The intruder thus
seeks to calculate the Pr(J = i|t,dsyn,S) for i = 1, . . . , n. Because the intruder
does not know the actual values in Y ∗, he or she should integrate over its possible
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values when computing the match probabilities. Hence, for each record we compute
Pr(J = i|t,dsyn,S) =
∫
Pr(J = i|t,dsyn, Y ∗,S)Pr(Y ∗|t,dsyn,S)dY ∗. (7)
This construction suggests a Monte Carlo approach to estimating each Pr(J =
i|t,dsyn,S). First, sample a value of Y ∗ from Pr(Y ∗|t,dsyn,S). Let Ynew represent
one set of simulated values. Second, compute Pr(J = i|t,dsyn, Y ∗ = Ynew,S) using
exact matching assuming Ynew are collected values. This two-step process is iterated
h times, where ideally h is large, and (7) is estimated as the average of the resultant h
values of Pr(J = i|t,dsyn, Y ∗ = Ynew,S). When S has no information, the intruder
treats the simulated values as plausible draws of Y ∗.
Following Reiter (2005), we quantify disclosure risk with summaries of these
identification probabilities. It is reasonable to assume that the intruder selects as a
match for t the record i with the highest value of Pr(J = i|t,dsyn,S), if a unique
maximum exists. We consider three risk measures: the expected match risk, the
true match rate, and the false match rate. Let ci be the number of records with the
highest match probability for the target ti; let Ii = 1 if the true match is among
the ci units and Ii = 0 otherwise. The expected match risk equals
∑
Ii/ci. When
Ii = 1 and ci > 1, the contribution of unit i to the expected match risk reflects
the intruder randomly guessing at the correct match from the ci candidates. Let
Ki = 1 when ciIi = 1 and Ki = 0 otherwise and let N denote the total number of
target records. The true match rate equals
∑
Ki/N , which is the percentage of true
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unique matches among the target records. Finally, let Fj = 1 when cj(1 − Ij) = 1
and Fj = 0 otherwise and let s equal the number of records with ci = 1. The false
match rate equals
∑
Fj/s, which is the percentage of false matches among unique
matches.
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Supplementary Material
In this online supplement we present detailed results regarding the impacts on
risk and analytical validity if additional measures beyond synthesizing the geocodes
are taken to further protect the data. Specifically, we look at two possible strategies:
Aggregating the geographical information to a higher level or synthesizing more
variables. We only present the results for the categorical CART synthesizer in this
supplement since the risk levels arguably are acceptable already for the other two
synthesizers. However, we ran all simulations for all synthesizers an verified that the
general findings regarding the relative performance of the three different synthesizers
remained the same. Detailed results for the other synthesizers can be obtained from
the authors upon request.
D Aggregating the geocoding information
Aggregation of detailed geographical information is the classical approach that most
statistical agencies choose when disseminating data to the public. In this section we
evaluate the impact of this strategy if used in combination with data synthesis, i.e.,
we assume the original data are aggregated first before the aggregated information is
synthesized in a second step. We expect two counterbalancing effects from this strat-
egy. On the one hand disclosure risks will generally decrease since with increasing
aggregation the number of individuals that share the same geographical information
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increases and thus it will be more difficult for the intruder to uniquely identify in-
dividuals using this information. On the other hand aggregating the geographical
information will imply that the number of levels for geography will decrease. Since
the selected synthesizer treats geography as a categorical variable we expect that
the fit of the CART model will increase and more terminal nodes of the tree will
contain only one geography, which in turn will imply that the synthetic geography
will match the true geography more often thus offering less protection.
The impacts on analytical validity are more difficult to measure. The improved
fit of the CART model will generally imply higher analytical validity, but obviously
analysis on a very detailed level will no longer be possible. Moreover, even on the
aggregated level, the boundaries of the geographic area the analyst is interested
in will not necessarily coincide with the boundaries based on the aggregation level
chosen by the agency.
We evaluate the impacts on validity and risk using three different aggregation lev-
els: Aggregation to 10, 100, and 1,000 square meter grids. The aggregated geocodes
are obtained by flooring the value of latitude and longitude value according to the
selected aggregation level. For measuring the analytical validity we use the UL
measure defined above. Since the grid levels do not necessarily match with the ZIP
code levels, we assume the analyst would simply assign the ZIP code that is closest
to the released geocode. This strategy could be improved by sampling from all ZIP
codes that fall in the same grid. However, we found that even for the 1,000 square
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Figure 6: Global utility loss(UL), Expected match risk, true match rate (in %), and
false match rate (in %) for various aggregation levels
meter grids less than 7.5% of the grids contained more than one ZIP code (< 0.25%
for the 100 square meter girds and only 4 out of more than 1.6 million grids for
the 10 square meter grids). Thus, we do not expect that improving the ZIP code
assignment will have major impacts on the results.
Results for the different aggregation levels are presented in Figure D. For the
risk measures we only present the results assuming the intruder would pick the level
of aggregation that leads to the maximum risk. We also include the utility and risk
measures for the exact geocodes from the previous sections for comparison.
Figure D indicates that the utility and risk more or less remain constant when
moving from the exact geocodes to the 10 square meter aggregation. The analytical
validity is highest if the geocodes are aggregated to 100 square meter grids but
the improvements in validity come at the price of an increased risk. Only for the
1,000 square meter grids we see a decrease in the risk measures compared to the
exact geocodes (except for the false match rate which is slightly lower). But the
risk levels are still considerably higher than the risk levels for the original data
without geocodes (the expected match risk and true match rate are 1821.16 and
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2.56%, respectively for these data). Thus, the agency would have to select even
larger aggregation levels to sufficiently protect the data. However, the UL measure
indicates that the analytical validity starts decreasing once the data are aggregated
beyond the 100 square meters grids. We emphasize again that any analysis based
on a finer level of detail than the ZIP code would likely be even more affected by
this aggregation step.
E Synthesizing more variables
As an alternative approach for increasing the protection offered by the categori-
cal CART synthesizer we evaluate synthesizing more variables in this section. We
start by synthesizing the age variable in addition to the geocode variable. Then
we successively add occupation and foreign status to the list of variables that are
synthesized. Finally, we evaluate a scenario in which all variables except sex and
wage are synthesized. Note that in this scenario some variables are synthesized that
are not known by the intruder according to our risk scenario. Thus, synthesizing
these variables will only have negative impacts on our utility measures but will not
decrease the risks. This setting can be seen as a conservative approach in which
the agency expects that additional variables might be available to the intruder in
the future even if they are not available now. We note that in all scenarios the
sensitive wage information is not synthesized. Not synthesizing wage implies that
51
ll
l
l
l
geo
geo+age
geo+age+occ
geo+age+occ+foreign
all except wage and sex
0.
09
0
0.
09
5
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Expected Match Risk
UL
l
l
l
l
l
geo
geo+age
geo+age+occ
geo+age+occ+foreign
all except wage and sex
0 5 10 15
True Match Rate
l
l
l
l
l
geo
geo+age
geo+age+occ
geo+age+occ+foreign
all except wage and sex
70 80 90 100
False Match Rate
Figure 7: Global utility loss(UL), Expected match risk, true match rate (in %), and
false match rate (in %) for various amounts of synthesis
the synthesis is only conducted to prevent reidentification. Obviously, the synthesis
could also be used to directly protect the sensitive information in the data. However,
different risk measures would be necessary to evaluate the success of this strategy.
Our risk measures focus on quantifying the risks of reidentification. The results for
these measures would not change if the wage information would also be synthesized.
Thus, we refrain from synthesizing the wage information in this evaluation. Results
for the different amounts of synthesis are presented in Figure E.
As expected both, analytical validity and disclosure risk decrease with increasing
amounts of synthesis. However, the risks decrease more substantially. For example, if
age is synthesized in addition to the geocode, the ULmeasure increases by 4.1% while
the expected risk and the true match rate decrease by 61% and 63% respectively
and the false match rate increases by 29%. The loss in validity is generally minor,
never more than 8% except for the last scenario in which almost all variables are
synthesized leading to negligible risk. But even in this scenario, the UL measure
is substantially lower than for the other two synthesizers even if we assume as in
Section 6.1 that these synthesizers would only be used to synthesize the geocode
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(9.84 · 10−2 compared to 10.95 · 10−2 for the continuous CART synthesizer and
14.94 ·10−2 for the DPMPM synthesizer if only the geocode is synthesized). We also
note that the analytical validity if age, occupation, and foreign status are synthesized
is comparable to the analytical validity if all geocodes are aggregated to 1,000 square
meter grids. However, the risks of disclosure are substantially smaller. Finally, the
expected risks for the scenario in which only age and geocodes are synthesized are
comparable to the risks under the current access model, i.e. without geocodes but
no alteration for any of the other variables (1820.46 versus 1821.16). Although the
percentage of correct unique matches among the target records (the true rate) is
larger (6.47% versus 2.56%) most of the declared unique matches (83.58%) would
be wrong (the false rate). Given that the intruder would know under the current
access strategy that all unique matches are correct matches, i.e. the false rate
would be zero, we feel that the overall risks are lower if age and geocode would be
synthesized. Thus, from a risk perspective it seems justified that the IAB could
provide access to a 2% sample of the data in which only the geocodes and the age
variable are synthesized, but the geocoding information would not be aggregated.
In this scenario the estimated risks are lower than the risks for a dataset that can
be accessed on the premises of the IAB already. Alternatively, the IAB could opt
for synthesizing more variables and releasing a larger sample instead.
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